We present a new combinatorial market maker that operates arbitrage-free combinatorial prediction markets specified by integer programs. Although the problem of arbitrage-free pricing, while maintaining a bound on the subsidy provided by the market maker, is #P-hard in the worst case, we posit that the typical case might be amenable to modern integer programming (IP) solvers. At the crux of our method is the Frank-Wolfe (conditional gradient) algorithm which is used to implement a Bregman projection aligned with the market maker's cost function, using an IP solver as an oracle. We demonstrate the tractability and improved accuracy of our approach on real-world prediction market data from combinatorial bets placed on the 2010 NCAA Men's Division I Basketball Tournament, where the outcome space is of size 2 63 . To our knowledge, this is the first implementation and empirical evaluation of an arbitrage-free combinatorial prediction market on this scale.
INTRODUCTION
Prediction markets have been successfully used to elicit and aggregate forecasts in a variety of domains, including business [Charette 2007; Spann and Skiera 2003] , politics [Berg et al. 2008] , and entertainment [Pennock et al. 2002] . In a prediction market, traders buy and sell securities with values that depend on some unknown future outcome. For instance, a play-money prediction market that Yahoo! ran for the 2010 NCAA Men's Division I Basketball Tournament included a security that paid out 1 point if the team from Duke were to win the championship and 0 points otherwise. Thus, when the price of the security was 0.15, traders who believed that Duke's probability of winning was larger than 0.15 were incentivized to buy shares of the security, and those that believed it was lower were incentivized to sell. The market price can be interpreted as an aggregate belief and used as a forecast.
We study prediction markets implemented by a centralized algorithm called a costbased market maker [Abernethy et al. 2011; . All shares are bought from and sold to the market maker, rather than between traders, and the market maker uses a convex potential function to determine current security prices. Compared with an exchange, which matches buyers and sellers, a market-maker mechanism is particularly desirable in combinatorial markets, which offer securities on interrelated propositions. For instance, the NCAA 2010 market included securities on events "Duke wins more games than Cornell" and "a team from the Big East conference wins the championship" as well as many others. Because of the large number of securities in combinatorial markets, there may be no sellers interested in trading with a given buyer, a problem known as low liquidity. In contrast, a market maker is always available to trade, thus providing liquidity and allowing incorporation of information in the market.
Designers of cost-based markets aim to meet several desirable properties, including boundedness of loss suffered by the market maker and absence of arbitrage, that is, risk-free profitable trades. Bounded loss is a necessity for money markets, otherwise the market operator risks bankruptcy. Lack of arbitrage is also highly desirable. First, we would like to attract traders that provide information rather than computation. Second, arbitrage-free markets produce more accurate forecasts. While Abernethy et al. [2011] provide a complete theoretical characterization of cost-based markets with bounded loss and no arbitrage, pricing in such markets is NP-hard or #P-hard for even the simplest combinatorial settings . Previous solutions restrict the betting language to allow polynomial time algorithms [e.g., Xia and Pennock 2011] or devise approximations [Dudík et al. 2012] .
In this paper we move beyond the hardness barrier. We hypothesize that while the pricing may be difficult in the worst case, a typical case is amenable to modern integer programming solvers. Guided by this hypothesis, we propose a fully general, bounded-loss, arbitrage-free market maker based on integer programming (IP) methods. Our market maker is guaranteed to maintain bounded loss, and attempts to remove arbitrage by making calls to the IP solver.
Our mechanism begins with any bounded-loss cost function and adds two ingredients. First, we use an integer program to specify the set of valid payoff vectors, each of which enumerates the security payoffs in a single outcome. Arbitrage-free prices are exactly the convex combinations of valid payoff vectors. Second, as we run the costbased market, we periodically remove arbitrage by projecting the market state onto the set of arbitrage-free prices, using the IP solver as an oracle within the projection algorithm. The integer program for payoff vectors is typically compact in size and easy to specify based on security definitions. For instance, when securities correspond to logical propositions, outcomes correspond to truth-assignment of literals, and each valid payoff vector enumerates 0 for false and 1 for true propositions in a given outcome. Conjunctions and disjunctions are easily expressed within an IP, so we have a compact representation for all problems in NP. To implement projection, we use the Frank-Wolfe algorithm [Frank and Wolfe 1956; Jaggi 2013] , also known as the conditional gradient algorithm, which is well-suited to our setting because it only accesses the target set (in our case, the set of valid payoff vectors) through the operation of linear optimization, which can be handled by an IP solver. The projection that we consider is the Bregman projection, which generalizes the Euclidean projection to arbitrary convex potentials.
There are two specific issues in applying the Frank-Wolfe (FW) algorithm within cost-based markets. First, while all iterates of the FW algorithm are within the convex hull of valid payoff vectors, and therefore arbitrage-free, we need to ensure that bounded loss is maintained. In Sec. 4.2, we show how to achieve this by a suitable modification of the stopping condition of FW. The second, seemingly more serious concern, is that the projection problems that arise for common cost functions, such as Hanson's [2003; logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), exhibit derivatives that go to infinity at the border of the set of arbitrage-free prices, which violates the assumptions of the FW algorithm. Fortunately, we can adapt a recently developed variant of FW [Krishnan et al. 2015] , designed for the case when the derivative might grow to infinity, but its growth is suitably controlled, which is the case for LMSR.
Our approach, which we call the Frank-Wolfe market maker (FWMM), is related to Dudík et al.'s [2012] linearly-constrained market maker (LCMM), which also alternates trades and (partial) arbitrage removal. While FWMM uses linear constraints in the IP to define valid payoff vectors, the arbitrage removal in LCMM is driven by a set of linear constraints on the arbitrage-free prices (i.e., the convex hull of valid payoff vectors). The IP constraints of FWMM can be used directly in LCMM, as linear-programming relaxations, but they are usually too loose, so tighter constraints need to be derived ad hoc for each new security type, sometimes using involved combinatorial reasoning [Dudík et al. 2012 [Dudík et al. , 2013 . Since LCMM updates are usually substantially faster than solving an IP, the arbitrage-removal steps of LCMM and FWMM can be interleaved, and the more expensive projection step of FWMM should be invoked only after LCMM cannot remove much arbitrage.
We evaluate the efficacy of FWMM on Yahoo!'s NCAA 2010 basketball tournament prediction market data, from which we extracted 88k trades on 5k securities in a combinatorial market with 2 63 outcomes. Once the projections become practically fast, FWMM achieves superior accuracy to LCMM. Our experiments also show that the initial phase of the projection algorithm, which involves calls to the IP solver to decide which securities can be logically settled given the games completed so far, is fast even for the largest problem sizes. The results from this initial phase can be propagated as a partial outcome into the cost function, which yields an improvement over LCMM even when the overall projection algorithm is too slow.
Tournaments have previously been considered by and Xia and Pennock [2011] . Both focus on restricted (but non-trivial) tournament betting languages that yield tractability, but cannot, for instance, handle comparisons. In contrast, our approach works for general outcome spaces that can be represented by an IP, rather than only tournaments. Our work is closely related to the applications of Frank-Wolfe and integer programming to inference in graphical models [Belanger et al. 2013; Krishnan et al. 2015] , but needs to address several issues specific to incentives and information revelation in prediction markets.
PRELIMINARIES
We begin with an overview of cost-based market making [Abernethy et al. 2011; and then provide a high-level outline of our approach. As a running example we use the NCAA 2010 Tournament: a single-elimination tournament with 64 teams playing over 6 rounds, meaning that in each round, half of the remaining teams are eliminated.
Cost-based market making
Let ⌦ denote a finite set of outcomes, corresponding to mutually exclusive and exhaustive states of the world. We are interested in eliciting expectations of binary random variables i : ⌦ ! {0, 1}, indexed by i 2 I, which model the occurrence of various events such as "Duke wins the NCAA championship." Each variable i is associated with a security, which is a contract that pays out i (!) dollars when the outcome ! occurs. Therefore, the random variable i is also called the payoff function. Binary securities pay out $1 if the specified event occurs and $0 otherwise. The vector ( i ) i2I is denoted . Traders buy bundles 2 R I of security shares issued by a central market maker; negative entries in are permitted and correspond to short-selling. A trader holding a bundle receives a (possibly negative) payoff · (!) when ! 2 ⌦ occurs. Following and Abernethy et al. [2011] , we assume that the market maker determines security prices using a convex and differentiable potential function C : R I ! R called a cost function. The state of the market is specified by a vector ✓ 2 R I listing the number of shares of each security sold so far by the market maker. A trader wishing to buy a bundle in the market state ✓ must pay C(✓+ ) C(✓) to the market maker, after which the new state becomes ✓ + . Thus, the vector of instantaneous prices in the state ✓ is p(✓) := rC(✓). Its entries can be interpreted as market estimates of E[ i ]: a trader can make an expected profit by buying (at least a small amount) of the security i if she believes that E[ i ] is larger than the instantaneous price p i (✓) = @C(✓)/@✓ i , and by selling if she believes that E[ i ] is lower than p i (✓); therefore, risk neutral traders with sufficient budgets maximize their expected profits by moving the price vector to match their expectation of . ). Thus, prices vary independently for each school, as if we ran two separate markets.
Arbitrage, marginal polytope and Bregman projection
We consider two standard desiderata for cost-based markets. The first is the bounded loss property: there should be a constant which bounds the ultimate loss of the market maker once the outcome is determined, regardless of how many shares of each security are sold. The second is the no arbitrage property: there should be no trade that guarantees a positive profit, regardless of the outcome. Following Abernethy et al. [2011] , we next relate bounded loss to properties of the convex conjugate of C, and review equivalence between optimal arbitrage removal and Bregman projection.
Given a cost function C, let R denote its convex conjugate,
which is itself a convex function on R I , allowed to take on the value 1. If the market is in a state ✓ = 0 and a trader believes that E[ ] = µ, then her expected profit for the bundle ✓ 0 is ✓ 0 · µ C(✓ 0 ) C(0) , which is maximized by Eq. (1), omitting the constant term C(0). More generally, the maximum expected profit of a trader with a belief µ in a market state ✓ can be shown to equal the mixed Bregman divergence, defined as
Convex conjugacy implies that D(µk✓) 0, with equality if and only if µ = p(✓), which is equivalent to ✓ 2 @R(µ), where @R is the subdifferential of R.
Example 2.3. For the LMSR, R(µ) is equal to negative entropy whenever µ is a probability distribution and 1 otherwise, i.e., R(µ) = I{µ 2 } + P i2I µ i ln µ i , where is the set of probability distributions on ⌦ and I{·} denotes the convex indicator, equal to 0 if true and 1 if false. Bregman divergence is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence,
, which is an information-theoretic measure of the difference between two probability distributions.
Let Z := { (!) : ! 2 ⌦} denote the (finite) set of all valid payoff vectors, and M be its convex hull, called the marginal polytope. The marginal polytope is exactly the set of vectors µ that can be written as expectations E[ ] under some probability distribution over ⌦, so we refer to elements of M as coherent beliefs or coherent prices. Abernethy et al. [2011] show that a cost-based market maker has the bounded loss property if and only if max z2Z R(z) < 1. We assume that this is the case for the conjugate of our cost C. Note that this assumption is satisfied for LMSR, because negative entropy equals zero at the vertices of the simplex. It is also satisfied in Example 2.2, where R(µ) is the sum of negative entropies of the two markets.
Given a state ✓, we define the Bregman projection of ✓ on M as the point
The Bregman projection is related to an optimal arbitraging trade by the following standard result (the proof is provided in Appendix A for completeness; all appendices are included in the full version of the paper on arXiv):
PROPOSITION 2.4. If the market is in a state ✓, the guaranteed profit of any trader is at most D(µ ? k✓) where µ ? is the Bregman projection of ✓ on M. Furthermore, this profit is achieved by any trade ? moving the market to a state ✓ ? with p(✓ ? ) = µ ? . This means that an arbitrage opportunity exists whenever the prices are incoherent, since p(✓) 6 2 M implies that D(µ ? k✓) > 0. After the trade ? , we have p(✓ ? ) = µ ? 2 M and thus there is no arbitrage opportunity in the market.
The outline of Frank-Wolfe market maker (FWMM)
The mechanism proposed in this paper, called Frank-Wolfe market maker, alternates between processing trades according to the cost C and removing arbitrage. In the arbitrage removal step, our goal is to find the state ✓ ? from Prop. 2.4. We do this by solving the Bregman projection problem using the Frank-Wolfe (FW) algorithm, which reduces the Bregman projection problem to a sequence of linear programs of the form min µ2M c · µ , for suitably chosen vectors c. Since the optimum of a linear program occurs at a vertex, reducing the Bregman projection problem to a sequence of linear programs results in an important simplification. Instead of specifying the marginal polytope M, whose description can be exponentially large in the number of securities, it suffices to describe its vertices Z, which we show can be done via a compact set of linear inequalities together with integer constraints. More precisely, we assume that the set Z is described by a matrix A and a vector b such that
Viewed in this way, the FW algorithm solves the Bregman projection problem by solving a sequence of integer programs. We refer to the linear constraints describing the set Z as IP constraints.
Example 2.5. We next derive IP constraints for the market for the number of wins of Duke and Cornell from Example 2.2. First, there are exclusivity and exhaustivity constraints of the form P 6 x=0 z j,x = 1 for j 2 {1, 2}, corresponding to the fact that in any outcome !, for each j, exactly one of the securities j,x (!) will equal 1 across x 2 {0, . . . , 6}. However, these two constraints do not capture the fact that at most one of the teams can have exactly 5 or 6 wins. Specifically, in any outcome !, we have 1,5 (!) + 2,5 (!) + 1,6 (!) + 2,6 (!)  1 .
Thus, we also include the third constraint: z 1,5 + z 2,5 + z 1,6 + z 2,6  1. Our reasoning so far shows that any valid payoff vector satisfies the three mentioned constraints. It can be verified that any vector z satisfying these constraints is valid, i.e., it corresponds to (!) for some ! 2 ⌦, so these three constraints correctly specify Z.
Linearly-constrained market maker (LCMM)
The FW algorithm relies on the ability to solve integer programs (IPs), which can take exponential time in the worst case. Therefore, our mechanism also incorporates fast (poly-time) partial arbitrage removal similar to Dudík et al.'s [2012] linearly-constrained market maker (LCMM).
In LCMM, arbitrage is partly removed by considering a set of linear constraints that must be satisfied by coherent prices. Namely, an LCMM takes as an input a relaxatioñ M ◆ M described by linear constraints called LCMM constraints:
When any LCMM constraint is violated, there is an arbitrage opportunity in the market, with an easy-to-compute arbitraging trade. LCMM acts as an arbitrager until none of the constraints are violated. SinceM is a relaxation of M, the resulting state is not necessarily arbitrage-free.
Assuming we have a description of Z using IP constraints specified by a matrix A and a vector b, one simple strategy is to constructM as a linear-program (LP) relaxation of Z, i.e.,M
These constraints are satisfied by all z 2 Z and hence also by their convex combinations µ 2 M. Generally, this relaxation is only a loose superset of M, so various ad hoc strategies are required to obtain a tighterM [Dudík et al. 2012 [Dudík et al. , 2013 ]. We present one example of such a strategy in Sec. 3, for the class of comparison securities.
MARKET DESIGN
We next show how to instantiate the market design elements of Sec. 2 in real-world combinatorial markets, including the NCAA 2010 tournament evaluated in Sec. 5. Namely, we need to define: (i) the payoff function , (ii) the cost function C, (iii) the initial market state ✓, (iv) the IP constraints describing Z, and (v) the LCMM constraints describingM. We also need to consider how the cost and market state should be updated as the true outcome is gradually revealed over time. For example, in the NCAA tournament, 63 games play out over the course of several weeks and we would like to fix prices of securities whose payoff has already been determined.
Compositional market design
We use a compositional market design along the lines of Dudík et al. [2013] , which is a generalization of the sum of LMSRs structure of Example 2.2. The market construction begins with a collection of random variables X j : ⌦ ! X j , indexed by j 2 J , whose marginal distributions we wish to elicit, such as the number of wins of Duke and Cornell in Example 2.2. Securities are indexed by i = (j, x), with j 2 J and x 2 X j , and correspond to indicators of the events X j = x, i.e.,
j,x (!) = 1{X j (!) = x} . The cost function is the sum of LMSRs across the random variables X j : round 1: 1 . An example of a tournament with four teams. The domains of the game outcome variables Gr,t are shown on the right. The shown variables are equivalent to additional game variables:
where b > 0 is the liquidity parameter controlling how fast the prices change in response to trading. A smaller value of b (lower liquidity) means prices rise faster as shares are purchased; a larger value of b (higher liquidity) yields slower changes. As in Example 2.2, Eq. (4) implies that we effectively run an independent LMSR market for each X j . Thus, in the absence of arbitrage removal steps, we say that C implements the independent markets cost function.
Initially, our market contains no random variables and hence no securities. The market operator can create new random variables and specify their relationship to any existing variables. At the time of creation of a new variable X j , the operator specifies (i) its domain X j , (ii) the mapping X j (!), (iii) initial prices µ j,x across x 2 X j (these prices determine the initial-state coordinates ✓ j,x ), (iv) IP constraints to restrict z j,x across x 2 X j , and (v) LCMM constraints to restrict µ j,x across x 2 X j . Due to the additive structure of the cost C, new variables X j can be added at any time during the run of the market without affecting prices of existing securities.
Below we specify the items (i)-(v) for different types of random variables in our market. When describing the IP constraints on z and LCMM constraints on µ, we use the notation z{X j = x} and µ{X j = x} for the entries z j,x and µ j,x , respectively. We also allow random variables with names other than X j , e.g., X or G r,t , and use the notation such as z{X = x} and µ{X = x} for the corresponding entries of z and µ.
When adding a new random variable X, the initial prices µ{X = x} can be chosen based on the prices of the random variables present in the market. New IP constraints always include the exclusivity and exhaustivity constraint, P x2X z{X = x} = 1, but additional constraints may be needed to correctly describe the mapping X(!). We add LCMM constraints using the simple strategy mentioned in Sec. 2.4, as an LP relaxation of IP constraints, with an exception of one variable type (comparison variables).
Our market contains random variables of the following types:
Atomic tournament variables. These random variables model outcomes in a singleelimination tournament with k rounds and 2 k teams. Teams are numbered 1 through 2 k . In the first round, there are 2 k 1 games, between teams 2i 1 and 2i, and the resulting 2 k 1 winners advance to the second round, where again teams are matched in the order of increasing indices and the winners advance to the next round etc. The team t is associated with the random variable X t whose outcome is the total number of wins of team t, i.e., X t = {0, . . . , k}. We also have random variables corresponding to the games played, with the outcome of each variable being the winner of the corresponding game. For a team t and round r, let G r,t denote the game that the team t will play in the r-th round if it advances to that point. We are slightly abusing notation, because G r,t and G r,t 0 can refer to the same game (and hence the same random variable) for distinct t and t 0 (see Fig. 1 ). For instance G k,t ⌘ G k,t 0 for all t, t 0 , as there is only one game (the finals) in round k. With this notation in hand, we can introduce the IP constraints relating the entries of z representing game and team variables:
for all t and r < k, z{X t = k} = z{G k,t = t} for all t.
LCMM constraints are just LP relaxations of the above, i.e., they are the same as the IP constraints, with z{·} replaced with µ{·}. The market operator needs to specify initial prices µ{X t = r} and µ{G k,t = t} explicitly, based for instance on the past performance of teams.
Sums. Given a set of existing random variables X 1 , . . . , X n taking on integer values with the minimum and maximum values m j := min X j and M j := max X j , we define a new random variable X to represent their sum,
The initial prices are set proportional to a discretized Gaussian distribution with the mean and variance equal to the sum of means and variances of X 1 through X n , under the distribution described by the current prices µ{X j = x}. We introduce the following IP constraint: P
As before, the added LCMM constraint is an LP relaxation of the added IP constraint.
Comparisons. Given two existing random variables X 1 and X 2 taking on integer values with the minimum and maximum values m j := min X j and M j := max X j , we define a new random variable X with the domain {lt, eq, gt} to represent the result of their comparison:
. The initialization prices are determined by first considering an integer-valued variable Y = X 2 X 1 , and initializing its distribution to the discrete Gaussian with the mean equal to the difference of means and the variance initialized to the sum of variances of X 2 and X 1 under current prices. The initial prices of X = lt, X = eq and X = gt are obtained as probabilities that Y < 0, Y = 0 and Y > 0. The variable Y is discarded and is not part of the market.
The IP constraints for the new entries of z are based on the following four identities:
To obtain IP constraints, we replace each X j with P x2Xj x · z{X j = x} on the left-hand side, and replace the comparison indicators on the right-hand side by z{X = lt} for 1{X 1 < X 2 }, and z{X = lt} + z{X = eq} for 1{X 1  X 2 }, and similarly for X 1 > X 2 and X 1 X 2 . LCMM constraints in this case are not simply an LP relaxation of IP constraints, but instead they yield a tighter setM. They are based on the following identities, which can be derived from the transitivity of the comparison and the union bound:
For instance, the first inequality follows because X 1  x implies that either X 1 < X 2 or X 2  x. Otherwise we would have a contradiction: X 1 X 2 > x. The resulting LCMM constraints are
, with analogous constraints with X 1 and X 2 swapped (and gt swapped for lt). We use the shorthand µ{X 2 E} for P x2E µ{X = x}.
Partial outcomes
In a typical combinatorial market, outcomes are gradually revealed over time. For example, in the NCAA tournament, 63 games play out over the course of several weeks. Thus, the market evolves through a sequence of partial outcomes defined as follows:
is called a partial outcome if there exists a valid payoff vector z 2 Z such that z i = b for all (i, b) 2 . We write I := {i : (i, b) 2 for some b} for the set of securities whose payoffs have been determined, or settled, by . As securities get settled, we would like to fix their prices to 0 or 1. This is not possible by simply updating the state, but instead we need to switch to a different cost function while maintaining the information state of the market. We adapt the construction of Dudík et al. [2014] to our setting.
First, we say that a vector u 2 R I is compatible with if u i = b for all (i, b) 2 . We write V for the set of vectors compatible with -note that V is an axis-aligned affine space of dimension |I\I |. Given a partial outcome , we define the set of associated valid payoffs Z := Z \ V , and the associated marginal polytope M := conv(Z ). We assume that given a partial outcome , the market maker uses the cost function
whose conjugate is, by definition, R (µ) = R(µ) + I{µ 2 V }, which coincides with R on M . The corresponding price map and Bregman divergence are denoted p and D .
The transformation of C to C maintains the loss bound of the original market maker (see Appendix B) and also maintains the information state of the market analogously to conditioning, as our next example shows.
Example 3.2. Partially settled LMSR. Recall that in a complete market, I = ⌦ and payoff vectors (!) have exactly one entry equal to 1: the entry corresponding to the realized outcome. Therefore, the partial outcome can have at most one security settled to 1. If there is such a security i ? then the market is fully settled and, by Eq. (5), we obtain C (✓) = ✓ i ? , p ,i (✓) = 1{i = i ? }. If only contains securities settled to zero, i.e., the corresponding outcomes have been excluded, the cost function obtained by Eq. (5) is an LMSR over the remaining outcomes, C (✓) = log( P i6 2I e ✓i ). The prices are p ,i (✓) = 0 for i 2 I and p ,i (✓) = e ✓i /( P j6 2I e ✓j ) for i 6 2 I , so the probability distribution over ⌦ described by p (✓) corresponds to p(✓) conditioned on the event ! 6 2 I .
FRANK-WOLFE MARKET MAKER
In this section we fully describe and analyze the Frank-Wolfe market maker (FWMM) outlined in Sec. 2.3.
At a high level, FWMM interleaves rapid pricing according to C with arbitrage removal, while also updating the partial outcome-see Mechanism 1. There are two kinds of arbitrage removal: fast but only partial arbitrage removal via an LCMM MECHANISM 1: Frank-Wolfe Market Maker (FWMM) Input: cost function C, initial state ✓0, initial partial outcome 0, LCMM constraints specified byÃ,b, IP constraints specified by A, b, FW algorithm parameters ↵ 2 (0, 1), "0 2 (0, 1), "D > 0
Initialize the market state and partial outcome: ✓ ✓0, 0 For t = 1, . . . , T (where T is an a priori unknown number of trades):
receive a request for a bundle t sell the bundle t for the cost C (
step, and a complete removal of the remaining arbitrage via Bregman projection. For LCMM steps we use the fast algorithm of Dudík et al. [2012] . Bregman projection is implemented via a variant of the Frank-Wolfe (FW) algorithm, which we refer to as
ProjectFW and describe later in this section. ProjectFW does not only return a new state ✓ such that p (✓) is the Bregman projection of the previous state on M . It also extends the partial outcome to securities that can be logically settled based on all other settled securities. This permanently removes the specific arbitrage opportunities associated with such securities since their prices become fixed to 0 or 1. Both arbitrage-removal steps correspond to trades that yield a non-negative profit regardless of the outcome, which means that the loss bound of the original cost C is only improved by the value of this profit. The non-negative profit of LCMM steps follows from Dudík et al. [2012] . For ProjectFW, which is an iterative algorithm, we guarantee non-negative profit by designing a suitable stopping condition.
As we mention earlier, while we hope that the IPs created during the run of the FW algorithm are easy to solve, they are NP-hard in general, and so the IP solver can get stuck in a brute-force search. Therefore, we need the ability to interrupt the projection step, for instance, when a new trade arrives. When our implementation, ProjectFW, is interrupted in early stages, it yields no update. In later stages, it returns an arbitragefree market state corresponding to a trade with a non-negative but possibly suboptimal profit. Thus, the loss bound is always maintained, even when ProjectFW is interrupted.
Fully-corrective Frank-Wolfe algorithm
Recall that the FW algorithm reduces the problem of Bregman projection, i.e., a convex minimization over the set M, into a sequence of linear optimization problems over the set Z. Our version, presented as Algorithm 2, is based on the fully-corrective variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm [Jaggi 2013] , also known as the simplicial decomposition method [Bertsekas 2015 ], which we overview next.
The FW algorithm solves problems of the form
where M is a compact convex set (in our case a polytope) and F is a convex function. Over the course of iterations t = 1, 2, . . . , the algorithm maintains an active set Z t of the vertices of the polytope M that have been discovered so far, and repeatedly:
(1) solves the minimization over the convex hull of Z t 1 to obtain a new iterate µ t := argmin
(2) finds a new descent vertex z t in the direction of the (negative) gradient of F ,
(3) and adds z t to the set of active vertices, so Z t = Z t 1 [ {z t }. Note that while the set Z of valid payoffs can be exponentially large, the set of active vertices Z t grows by only one vertex per iteration (and is initialized with only a small number of vertices). Therefore, Step (1), which is a convex optimization problem of dimension |Z t |, can be solved efficiently by standard algorithms. We use accelerated projected gradient [Nesterov 2007 ].
Step (2), the linear optimization over the set Z, is the computationally expensive step. As discussed in Sec. 2.3, in our case it can be implemented by a call to an IP solver. In all of our experiments, the running time of Step (2) substantially dominated the running time of Step (1).
The convergence of the FW algorithm is analyzed via the FW gap, defined as
which bounds the suboptimality of µ. Specifically, g(µ) F (µ) F (µ ? ), where µ ? is a solution to Eq. (6). Thus, we can just monitor the gap g(µ t ) = rF (µ t ) · (µ t z t ), and return the iterate µ t when the gap becomes sufficiently small. The gap converges to zero at the rate of O(L diam(M)/t) where L is the Lipschitz constant of rF under an arbitrary norm and diam(M) is the diameter of M under the same norm [Jaggi 2013 ].
To apply the FW algorithm to the problem of Bregman projection, we set its objective to the Bregman divergence: F (µ) = D(µk✓) = R(µ) + C(✓) ✓ · µ. One formal problem arises due to the fact that the function R is not necessarily differentiable only subdifferentiable. To overcome this, we assume existence of a differentiable extensionR. For LMSR, this isR(µ) = I{µ 0} + P i2I µ i ln µ i , and similarly for the sum of LMSRs. The key point is thatR coincides with R over M, so we can optimize the (differentiable) function F (µ) =R(µ) + C(✓) ✓ · µ. (More details in Appendix C.) Apart from differentiability, there are two additional challenges in applying the FW algorithm within Mechanism 1. First, we need to choose a stopping condition for the FW algorithm that would yield a state update with a guaranteed profit, since such updates maintain the worst-case loss bound of the market maker. Second, even though we have achieved the differentiability of F for our case of interest (the sum of LMSRs), the resulting derivative is unbounded, so the standard convergence analysis of FW does not apply. Fortunately, the growth of the derivative at the boundary is sufficiently controlled to obtain convergence of a modified version of FW, which is what we use in Algorithm 2. (The precise statement of the controlled growth condition is in Appendix C.)
The modified version of FW, due to Krishnan et al. [2015] , performs FW iterations over a contracted version of the polytope M, or, more precisely, over a contracted version of Mˆ , which reflects already settled securities. The contracted polytope is defined as M 0 := (1 ")Mˆ + "u, where u 2 Mˆ is a coherent price vector whose coordinates are neither 0 nor 1, except for those already settled byˆ . In other words, M 0 is a version of Mˆ shrunk towards the point u, which we call an interior point. Input: cost function C, state ✓, partial outcome , IP constraints specified by A, b, approx. ratio ↵ 2 (0, 1), initial contraction "0 2 (0, 1), convergence threshold "D > 0
Output: extended partial outcomeˆ ◆ state✓, whose price vector is an approx. Bregman projection of ✓ on Mˆ in the sense that one of the following holds: 1. pˆ (✓) 2 Mˆ and moving from ✓ to✓ guarantees the profit of ↵Dˆ (µ ? k✓) 2.✓ = ✓ and Dˆ (µ ? k✓)  "D 3. algorithm was interrupted; moving from ✓ to✓ guarantees a non-negative profit where µ ? = argmin µ2Mˆ Dˆ (µk✓) Initialize the interior point, active vertex set, and extend the partial outcome:
perform a FW iteration on the contracted polytope:
rRˆ (µ t ) call IP solver to find the descent vertex (note that rF (µ t ) = ✓t ✓):
zt
Since coordinates of u are bounded away from 0 and 1, the vertices of the contracted polytope M 0 have their coordinates also bounded away from 0 and 1 (except for Iˆ ). The controlled growth property then gives a bound on the Lipschitz constant of the gradient and guarantees convergence for any fixed ", for the problem of projecting onto M 0 . To obtain the convergence to the projection onto Mˆ , we adaptively decrease " according to the rule of Krishnan et al. [2015] . Their analysis shows that this adaptive version of FW drives the duality gap g(µ t ) to zero and thus indeed solves the non-contracted problem. Two missing pieces that we describe in the remainder of this section are the stopping condition and the construction of the interior point u.
Stopping condition for the FW algorithm
The stopping condition needs to ensure that moving the market from a state ✓ to✓ constitutes a trade with a non-negative profit. We start with a lower bound on the ALGORITHM 3: InitFW. Initialization for ProjectFW.
Input: partial outcome , IP constraints specified by A, b
Output: extended partial outcomeˆ ◆ point u 2 Mˆ such that ui 2 (0, 1) for i 6 2 Iˆ non-empty set Z0 of vertices of Mˆ Initialize Z0 ;,ˆ , C ;
{the unique point compatible withˆ } Returnˆ , Z0, and u = 1
guaranteed profit of any iterate of the FW algorithm, and then use it to derive the stopping condition. We omit the conditioning onˆ from the exposition here.
PROPOSITION 4.1. Consider a purchase that moves the market from a state ✓ to a new state✓ = rR(μ). The resulting profit is guaranteed to be at least D(μk✓) g(μ).
Thus, it is "safe" to move the market to✓ whenever D(μk✓) g(μ) (for proof see Appendix D). To maximize the profit guarantee, we should return the iterate that maximizes the difference D(μk✓) g (μ) , which is what we do in Algorithm 2.
Apart from a forced interruption (e.g., because of the arrival of a new trade or exceeding of the time limit), the stopping conditions of Algorithm 2 concern two separate cases. First, recall that the algorithm is minimizing F (µ) = D(µk✓) via a sequence of iterates µ t 2 M that satisfy D(µ t k✓) ! D(µ ? k✓) and g(µ t ) ! 0 as t ! 1. Therefore, if prices p(✓) are incoherent, i.e., D(µ ? k✓) > 0, eventually we will have g(µ t ) < D(µ t k✓). In fact, we can guarantee something stronger. Namely, given a fixed ↵ 2 (0, 1), we will reach an iteration when g(µ through coordinates i that have not been settled in the provided partial outcome , and calls the IP solver to find a valid vectorẑ that is consistent with , but also has the i-th coordinate equal to b = 0 or b = 1. If the IP solver fails to find suchẑ for either value b, it means that the i-th coordinate can be settled to 1 b. Otherwise the foundẑ is added to the set of active vertices. This guarantees that each coordinate i is either present inˆ , or the active set contains some valid vertices with both the value 0 and 1 at the i-th coordinate. Therefore, the average of the active vertices satisfies the requirement for u. If the active set is empty, it means that all of the securities have been settled and the unique valid vector consistent withˆ satisfies the requirement.
EXPERIMENTS

Data description
Our data consists of bets made in Predictalot, a combinatorial prediction market run by Yahoo! in 2010 for the NCAA Men's Division I Basketball Tournament, commonly known as March Madness. 1 The tournament lasted from March 18th to April 5th, 2010. It consisted of 64 teams playing a single-elimination tournament over 6 rounds. In each round, half of the remaining teams were eliminated. Traders were allowed to buy securities at any point in time throughout the tournament; the first bets were placed four days prior to the tournament start and the last bets were placed towards the end of the final match. Many bets referred to groupings of teams, known as conferences, brackets or seeds (e.g., there are sixteen seed levels and four teams to each seed).
There were 93 036 bets placed altogether on many different securities in Predictalot. Our experiments focus on a large subset of these, which we briefly describe here. The largest group of bets (56%) can be expressed as bundles over atomic tournament variables (winners of individual games, and the number of wins of individual teams). These include bets such as "Duke wins exactly 3 games", "Cornell exits in round 2 or later", "a team from the Big Ten conference wins the championship". In addition to these bets, we also supported combinatorial bets for comparisons of the number of wins of single teams, e.g., "Duke wins more games than Cornell", and comparisons of the number of wins by teams from different conferences, e.g., "teams from Big Ten win more games than teams from Big East". These were implemented as comparison variables derived from pairs of atoms, and pairs of sums, respectively. The two comparison types encompass 12% of original bets.
Our resulting dataset contains 63 689 bets, constituting 68% of all bets in the original market. Combinatorial bets (comparisons) make up 17% of our final dataset. The three largest groups of bets we did not include were: "team t 1 wins more games than t 2 , and t 3 wins more games than t 4 " (6%); "the number of upsets in round r will be less than/equal to/greater than c" (3%); and "the sum of seeds in round r will be less than/equal to/greater than c" (3%).
Price initialization. Our dataset contains realized trades, but we have no other price data from the run of the market. In particular, the initial Predictalot prices were not available, so we used the following scheme to initialize atomic tournament variables X t (the number of wins of team t) and G r,t (the outcome of a game). We considered bets within the 6 hour time window starting at 27 hours and ending at 21 hours before the 1 Securities in the Predictalot market were priced using the Monte Carlo method with importance sampling against a dynamic proposal distribution. One of the larger issues, which we do not expect with the optimization methods presented in this work, was substantial price volatility as the tournament progressed, due to an increasing mismatch between the market belief and the proposal distribution. In order to avoid trivial arbitrage, independent samples were drawn to form the prices quoted to the traders, and the actual prices imposed on trade executions. As a result, some trades transacted at prices significantly different than quoted.
[D. Pennock, personal communication, Feb. 22, 2016] first match of the tournament. Let µ 0 denote the price at which securities were sold in this window (we use last such price if multiple exist). To initialize the game variables G r,t , we use the prices of bets on the champion of the tournament (i.e., X t = k): µ{G
where T is the set of all teams that can reach the game G r,t ; if the denominator equals zero, we initialize prices µ{G r,t = t 0 } across t 0 2 T to a uniform distribution. To initialize securities X t = x, we proceeded as follows. If µ 0 {X t = x} is present, we use that as the initialization price, otherwise we use the difference between µ 0 {G x,t = t} and µ 0 {G x+1,t = t}, where we replace one or both of these terms by our already calculated prices according to µ whenever the µ 0 prices are not present. The resulting prices are then normalized to sum to one for each X t . The team and game prices are then projected on the polytope described by LCMM constraints to obtain market initialization.
Settling outcomes. Similar to initialization prices, the times when the individual games were settled were not available, so we handcrafted a dataset consisting of all game start times 2 (to the best of our knowledge, end times are not listed anywhere) and settled each game 100 minutes after the game start. The choice of 100 minutes is conservative, based on the anecdotal observation that the shortest NCAA games last about 120 minutes, including the time for commercials and timeouts.
Evaluation
We compare three market treatments: independent markets (IND), the linearly contrained market maker (LCMM), and a market maker with both linear constraints and Bregman projections for arbitrage removal (FWMM). Each market maker builds upon and extends the previous one. Recall that in IND, we use LMSR to price the securities associated with each random variable, but prices for separate variables vary independently, even if the underlying events are related. LCMM enforces price relationships across random variables using linear constraints, and FWMM adds projection steps onto the marginal polytope. The market makers were implemented in Java, using Gurobi Optimizer 5.5 3 to solve the integer programs in the FW algorithm. We refer to our implementation as the (market) engine.
We evaluate the three market makers by a counterfactual replay of the trades placed in Predictalot. All the market makers depend on the liquidity parameter b (see Eq. 4). Rather than optimizing b, we used a fixed liquidity of 150 and varied each trader's budget. (The effect is equivalent, as increasing the budget increases price responsiveness to the trade orders.) Each trade order is viewed as a new agent, so the budget is constant for each trade. We used budget levels 0.1, 1, 10, 100, and 1000.
For each trade, the Predictalot dataset contains the number of shares purchased and the total cost paid. By taking the average price per sharep, we obtain a lower bound on the trader's probability estimate when the trade was placed. From this we create a limit order for our market engine by drawing a limit price uniformly from [p, 1], and providing the constant budget level mentioned previously. A limit order states that the trader wishes to purchase shares until either the market price reaches the limit price, or the budget is exhausted, whichever occurs first. Any sell orders with average pricep were transformed into buy orders of the complementary bundle, at price 1 p, and then converted into limit orders. By using three different seeds for the randomization, we generated three input files for the market engine. All market makers were run on all three input files. As the results were highly consistent across the randomization seeds, we found three replicates to be sufficient.
To summarize, we ran the three different market makers (IND, LCMM, FWMM) at five budget levels (0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000) over the three randomly generated input files. During a market run, the engine records summaries of security prices and prices of all purchased bundles. These summaries are generated at regular intervals, including every hour and every 100 trades. We use the log likelihood to assess the accuracy of the security prices, viewed as probability forecasts, at a given point in time. Let µ be the price vector. We consider log likelihoods associated with two different kinds of events. First is the log likelihood assigned to the final realized value x ? of a variable X, which equals log µ{X = x ? }. Second is the log likelihood corresponding to the bundle of the form X 2 E, viewed as a binary variable (the event occurs or not), which is defined as 1{x ? 2 E} log µ{X 2 E} + 1{x ? 6 2 E} log µ{X 6 2 E} . A larger log likelihood indicates a better forecast. We report the average log likelihood over all variables, and the average log likelihood over all purchased bundles. The former can be viewed as an average accuracy of the market, the latter is weighted towards the part of the market that sees more trading.
Effect of liquidity. We first examine the effect of varying the budget level (equivalently, liquidity) on the overall performance of the three market makers. Fig. 2 provides the average prediction accuracy of the three market makers over variables and bundles, where the average is taken over all hourly summaries. The plots show the expected trends: when budget is too low, traders cannot incorporate their information into the market, while when budget is too high, prices are too sensitive to individual trades. The optimal budget setting is 10 for IND and LCMM, and 100 for FWMM. However, both LCMM and FWMM are far less sensitive to the budget level than IND, because information propagation (via constraints) can correct wrong bets.
The improvement of FWMM over LCMM for variables ranges from 2.1% to 5.6%, with a median of 3.3% over all budget levels and random seeds. For bundles, the improvement ranges from 0.9% to 3.2%, with a median of 2.2%. For the time period covering the first 16 games, LCMM and FWMM are very similar (see the next section), bringing their average performance closer together; excluding these games, the median improvement increases from 3.3% to 12.4% for securities, and from 2.2% to 5.6% for bundles. Because accuracy here is averaged over all hourly summaries, it is implictly weighed by duration, which is hard to interpret. To obtain a more fine-grained view, we next consider the evolution of market accuracy over time. In Fig. 3 , we see that once Bregman projections successfully complete, the improvement of FWMM over LCMM becomes sustained. The accuracy improvements from this point onwards range from 0% to 80% for variables, with a median of 38% over all hourly summaries. The improvements range from 0% to 44% for bundles, with a median of 9%.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In our experiments, FWMM outperformed LCMM once the outcome space was sufficiently reduced, via settled securities, to allow computing of Bregman projections within 30 minutes on a standard workstation. This time limit yielded a manageable experimental turnaround, with about 5 hours to execute the trades that originally spanned 22 days. In practice, a market designer can allow longer computation and use more powerful hardware, and expect improvements for larger problem sizes.
Several approaches could further speed up our framework. For instance, FW can be used to construct separating hyperplanes to tighten the outer LCMM approximation, and thereby contribute to arbitrage removal even when there is no time to compute the projection. Also, instead of solving IPs to optimality in each iteration, it may be possible to interleave IP with local search to obtain additional descent vertices. Since IP is by far the most time-consuming part of FW, this could yield substantial speedups.
